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ABSTRACT
This article examines the mechanisms for combating global terror-
ism which emerged in Europe and Southeast Asia in the aftermath of
11 September, the Bali bombing, the two Jakarta bombings, and the
Madrid train bombings.  The article argues that, despite various
attempts at crafting a common security framework in each region,
the most successful examples of counter-terrorism and anti-terrorism
cooperation thus far have been at the bilateral and trilateral levels.
In balancing between national security priorities and multilateral
cooperative arrangements, the main difference between the
European and Southeast Asian approach comes from the different
ways in which the terrorist threat is perceived. While the European
reaction is determined by the acknowledgement of a “common exter-
nal threat,” the Southeast Asian response is based on the recognition
of a “common internal threat.” Such divergence of perspectives
invariably nuances the scope of national and regional initiatives in
each case scenario. These are further reinforced by the ideational
and operational modalities of each regional community (EU and
ASEAN).1
THE GLOBAL CONTEXT
The suicide operations on 11 September 2001 against the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon transformed the concept and the practice of interna-
tional security. The asymmetric use of force by a transnational network of al-
Qaeda affiliated religious extremists – bent on producing mass-casualty, syn-
chronized attacks and disgracing America on its own soil and at the heart of its
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own symbols – astounded the world. The audacity of the perpetrators and their
non-conventional use of conventional technologies demonstrated that even the
universally recognized hegemon of the post-Cold War international system could
not prevent its territory and resources from being utilized to inflict damage on its
own citizens and infrastructure. 
In consequence, terrorism emerged from the backwaters to which it had
been relegated following the neutralization of terrorist groups from the far left
and the far right in the 1970s and the 1980s and the semi-successful resolution
of various communal, ethnic, and separatist conflicts in the 1990s. The sheer
magnitude and the destructive scale of the 11 September attacks called for a com-
prehensive re-evaluation of the security threat posed by al-Qaeda and its associ-
ated groups. The dreadful ability of international terrorists and their transnation-
al networks to strike “anyone, anywhere, anytime” required immediate action
and a resolute response. Policy makers worldwide recognized the challenge and
braced their societies for a lengthy struggle.
Responding to these atrocious acts, President George W. Bush declared a
“global war on terror” (GWOT) and designated it America’s number one foreign
policy priority. He committed the US nation and its people to a worldwide, multi-
front, and multifaceted campaign. Its key initiatives focused on interdicting al-
Qaeda operatives and disrupting their terrorist support infrastructures; dislodg-
ing state sponsors of terrorism and warning other nations against providing per-
missive environments for terrorist groups; and cautioning pre-emptive strikes
against weapons of mass destruction proliferation regimes.2 Its methods includ-
ed military action, law enforcement, sharing intelligence information, freezing
financial assets, and concerted drives for international cooperation. In response
to the pervasiveness of the threat, counter-terrorism and anti-terrorism activities
increased both domestically and internationally.
In the early months after 11 September, a brief crystallization of the will of
the international community to fight terrorism also occurred. The contours of a
coherent and uniform international policy were outlined in a succession of UN
resolutions, which rejected “the prevalent moral ambivalence on terrorism and
declared unambiguously that no moral and political justification could be accept-
ed for acts of terror.”3 These were reinforced by a strong and sustained rhetoric
on the part of President Bush, who spoke of “a world where freedom itself is
under attack,” and a “war on terrorism” that will not stop until “terrorist groups
of global reach have been found, have been stopped, and have been defeated.”4
Almost immediately after 11 September, governments in Europe and
Southeast Asia responded positively by aligning their administrations and soci-
eties with the US-led GWOT. On 21 September 2001, the European Union (EU)
Heads of State and Heads of Government approved a framework action plan on
terrorism and incorporated the fight against al-Qaeda into all aspects of the EU’s
internal, foreign, and security policy.5 In December 2003, the European Council
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(EC) adopted a common European Security Strategy, in which it reiterated the
need for EU member-states to combat global terrorism through joint action with
both regional and extra-regional partners.6 Following the Madrid train bombings
on 11 March 2004, the EC issued a solidarity clause, pledging to help any EU
country that fell victim to a terrorist attack, and appointed Dutch politician Gijs
de Vries as the EU’s counter-terrorism coordinator.7 His mandate included over-
seeing the EU’s anti-terrorism policy and streamlining the implementation of
counter-terrorism measures among EU member-states. In December 2004, the
previous EU action plan on terrorism was updated to bolster security procedures
and enhance operational cooperation.8
Similarly, on 5 November 2001, the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) ratified a Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism,
focusing on strengthening national mechanisms and improving regional channels
of cooperation.9 An ASEAN Work Programme on Counter-Terrorism was adopt-
ed on 17 May 2002, outlining a three-stage process to combat terrorism by rati-
fying international conventions and protocols; prescribing practical cooperation
between national law enforcement agencies under the headings of
ASEANAPOL; and encouraging extra-regional cooperation with ASEAN part-
ners.10 During this period the ASEAN Ministerial Committee on Transnational
Crime emerged as a useful platform for sharing best practices and enhancing
information exchange, intelligence sharing, and capacity building.11 In the wake
of the Jakarta bombings against the Marriott Hotel on 5 August 2003, and the
Australian embassy on 9 September 2004, ASEAN member-states sought to
strengthen the regional legal framework for combating terrorism by signing the
Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters on 28 November 2004.12
The signing of common strategic agreements between the prevalent multi-
lateral institution in each region and the United States further reinforced such
demonstrations of transatlantic and transpacific sympathy and political goodwill.
A US-EU Terrorism Pact was endorsed on 25 June 2003.13 A US-EU Summit in
Ireland on 26 June 2004 renewed the two parties’ commitment to fight global ter-
rorism.14 A number of US-EU strategic agreements to strengthen police and judi-
cial cooperation, enhance border control and transport security, and streamline
procedures for extraditing terrorist suspects were also signed.15 Although some
differences of emphasis still remained, America and the European Union agreed
that the best ways to tackle global terrorism are by combining judicial, police,
diplomatic, and military means along with a long-term political approach. 
In terms of Southeast Asia, a US-ASEAN Joint Declaration for
Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism was ratified on 1 August 2002.16
During the 17th US-ASEAN Dialogue in Bangkok, Thailand in January 2004, a
US-ASEAN Counter-Terrorism Work Plan was adopted to complement
ASEAN’s own Counter-Terrorism Programme.17 In addition to securitizing the
issue of international terrorism, criminalizing its practices, and enlisting region-
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al partners in the global fight against al-Qaeda, these accords served the purpose
of enhancing regional capacity building measures and initiating information
sharing procedures among co-signatories. Both in terms of diplomacy, military
assets, and money, America recast its strategic engagement in Southeast Asia
under the heading of combating terrorism. 
THE DOMESTIC CONTEXT
Despite such broad-ranging and far-reaching commitments on the diplo-
matic front, the fight against terrorism on the domestic front remained the pre-
rogative of individual nation-states. The need to target-harden important infra-
structures and to develop emergency preparedness plans against possible terror-
ist attacks gave rise to the “homeland security paradigm” of national defence.18
This paradigm effectively blurred the traditional distinction between internal and
external security. Both at the legislative and at the executive level, national lead-
ers and their administrations held the key to whether or not terrorist networks
would be unraveled, terrorist members prosecuted, and pertinent information
shared with neighboring states. Even when recognizing the transnational nature
of the threat and the need for joint action to thwart transborder flows of individ-
uals, weapons, and money, some governments continued to feel constrained by
their domestic political contexts and priorities. A crisis-driven paradigm of
domestic counter-terrorism response emerged as a result.
For instance, although former Indonesian President Megawati
Sukarnoputri was the first international leader to visit the White House in the
immediate aftermath of 11 September and to pledge her country’s unconditional
support for the US-led coalition against terror,19 she was later compelled to con-
demn America’s bombing of Afghanistan. Facing staunch criticism from
Indonesia’s Islamist opposition parties and considering her own precarious polit-
ical standing, President Megawati maintained a difficult balance between exter-
nal commitments and internal priorities. As a result, Indonesia’s domestic record
of counter-terrorism responses was rather tepid at first. Regional neighbors like
Singapore and Malaysia often felt exasperated that Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) terror-
ists, who had managed to escape their own jurisdictions and national territories,
could find easy safe-haven and logistical support inside Indonesia. 
This situation changed dramatically after the horrific suicide attacks
against two tourist nightspots in Bali on 12 October 2002. The political outcry
stemming from the bombings and the negative economic impact on the country’s
tourism industry created the necessary political environment for Megawati to act.
On 18 October 2002, she issued two presidential decrees effectively criminaliz-
ing all acts of terrorism and creating special judicial powers for prosecuting ter-
rorist suspects involved in the Bali bombing. On 6 March 2003, these were offi-
cially passed into national laws.20 A special task force was formed under Major
General Pastika to investigate the Bali attack and to bring those responsible to
The Journal of Conflict Studies
11
justice. However, lack of institutional capacity and poor coordination among
Indonesia’s security and intelligence agencies prevented the full dismantling of
the Jemaah Islamiyah network and paved the way for more attacks. The terror-
ist operations against the JW Marriott Hotel on 5 August 2003 and the Australian
Embassy on 9 September 2004 only confirmed the susceptibility of the country
to terrorism. 
Following the election of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as Indonesia’s new
president in October 2004, there was much optimism both in the region and inter-
nationally that the government’s stance against JI would receive a significant
boost. For one, Yudhoyono had previously acted as Coordinating Minister for
Security and Political Affairs during President Megawati’s term in office, and
had presided in this capacity over the crafting of a comprehensive and coordi-
nated policy to eradicate terrorism in the country.21 He had also repeatedly
voiced his determination to clamp down on Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia and
to work more closely with the United States, Australia, and other ASEAN coun-
tries. 
But without a clear majority in parliament and having to maintain a deli-
cate balance within his own coalition government, President Yudhoyono proved
reluctant to stage a full-scale crackdown. Instead, his cabinet continued to dis-
mantle JI sleeper cells and JI-affiliated clandestine rings with proven connections
to terrorism. This reluctance also manifested itself in the unwillingness of the
country to proscribe Jemaah Islamiyah and the leniency that some JI terrorist
suspects received during sentencing.22 The uncertain course of the judicial pro-
ceedings against Abu Bakar Ba’asyir – the alleged spiritual leader of JI – is
another case in point.23 Although Yudhoyono’s personal commitment to the
GWOT and to Indonesia’s role in it is not to be doubted, his government is
unwilling to portray itself as caving in too much to US pressure, while alienating
the country’s predominantly Muslim population. Moreover, other important
challenges facing Indonesia – such as corruption, economic reforms, and demo-
cratic transition – have taken priority over the day-to-day fight with terrorism.
Similarly, in Europe, the presence of large diaspora communities from
North Africa and the Middle East has resulted in a certain political unwillingness
to identify the terrorist threat as “coming from within” and to equate it, instead,
with radical elements “coming from outside.” In the immediate aftermath of
9/11, Europe associated the security challenge of al-Qaeda and its affiliated
groups with an external foreign threat. Its sources originated outside of Europe
and were linked primarily to non-citizens or first and second-generation immi-
grants, who had effectively transported violence directed against their home
countries to European soil.24 In consequence, the majority of European politi-
cians were particularly careful not to create the impression that they were target-
ing law-abiding Muslim citizens. By contrast, they were especially vocal about
illegal immigrants and political refugees, who “misuse Europe’s freedoms” and
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the continent’s “social atmosphere of religious and ethnic tolerance.”25 Measures
implemented to delimit the granting of political asylum and refugee status to
incoming immigrants were indicative of these tendencies.26
Great Britain, in particular, has long been identified as a sanctuary and
breeding ground for Islamist militants. In 2000, the Blair administration enacted
two far-reaching counter-terrorism laws, effectively broadening the definitions
of domestic and transnational terrorism and promoting the government’s “special
arrest powers” to prosecute terrorist members and terrorist supporters.27 These
legislative measures were further strengthened by the adoption of the Anti-
Terrorism Crime and Security Act of 2001, allowing for the indefinite detention
without trial of non-British nationals suspected of terrorism.28 However, in view
of the historical record of British citizens involved in terrorist activities – includ-
ing a number of major al-Qaeda plots abroad – these new statutory powers will
have little effect on dampening domestic participation in international terrorism.
In April 2003, two British nationals took part in a suicide operation in Tel Aviv,
Israel.29 At present, two other British-born Islamists are in detention in Morocco
on terrorism charges related to the Casablanca bombing of 16 May 2003.30
Furthermore, in the three years since 11 September, UK-born and UK-bred ter-
rorists – such as Omar Said Sheikh (the mastermind of the kidnapping and killing
of US journalist Daniel Pearl in Pakistan in January 2002) and Richard Reid (the
al-Qaeda “shoe-bomber,” who attempted to ignite explosives on a Paris-Miami
overseas flight in December 2001) – have figured prominently on the interna-
tional terrorism scene. 
In the aftermath of the Madrid attacks, such threat perceptions underwent
a slight change. For one, the majority of the perpetrators were North African
migrant workers who had settled down in Spain and had launched the attacks in
response to the participation of Prime Minister Aznar’s government in the Iraq
war.31 Reporting on the key findings from the criminal probe, Spanish Judge
Juan del Olmo attributed these heinous acts to a clandestine terrorist network that
had prepared and executed the bombings from within Europe’s territory and with
the help of European citizens.32 The killing of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh
– by a Dutch-born national of Moroccan origin, who had no prior jihad experi-
ence or known connections to terrorism – only confirmed the danger of domes-
tic radicalization. Policy makers in the Netherlands responded immediately by
introducing tougher anti-terrorism laws and enhancing the investigative powers
of law enforcement agencies.33 These initiatives stood in stark contrast to the
country’s tradition of paying homage to civil rights and civil liberties. 
In both cases, however, the threat of terrorism continued to be associated
with immigration practices and unassimilated Muslim minorities. Such consid-
erations were poignantly reflected in various national debates surrounding refer-
endum voting on the new EU Constitution.34 Looming membership for Turkey,
together with the need to open up European markets to foreign labor, have
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become particular areas of concern. European voters are cognizant of the dangers
inherent in global terrorism, but do not consider them intrinsic to their own
domestic political contexts. It is still Europe’s physical location – in near prox-
imity to conflict zones such as Bosnia, Chechnya, Iraq, and Afghanistan – that
renders them vulnerable to returning jihadists or newly recruited ones.35
Moreover, it is the duty of their own security apparatuses and law enforcement
agencies to be prepared to countermand the radicalizing influences which such
external elements exert on their own domestic Muslim communities (i.e. foreign
jihadists, radical Middle Eastern and North African clerics, jihadist websites, and
transnational recruiting networks).36
What this indicates is that domestic regulatory measures against terrorism
are always context-specific and driven by trial-and-error practices. The need to
reconcile democratic principles of governance with tough internal security meas-
ures – crafted to prevent acts of terrorism both at home and abroad – remains an
ongoing, but necessary struggle. When extrapolated at the regional level, these
developments create situations where nation-states cooperate and coordinate pri-
marily in the name of short-term political interests and immediate social and eco-
nomic gains. Such difficulties are unavoidable given the magnitude of the threat
and the challenges facing individual countries. Limited resources, bureaucratic
and judicial disparities, and varying domestic and foreign policy contexts all play
a role. 
At the regional level the need to harmonize these divergent domestic
counter-terrorism experiences with the unifying requirements of international
agreements presents an even more daunting task. Identifying a common threat,
recognizing shared vulnerabilities, and coming up with a multilateral framework
to redress these issues is a slow process. For one, the US-led GWOT is only one
of the many priorities that local governments face, both at the national and the
international level. Second, the varying domestic political environments and for-
eign policy expectations of individual nation-states further complicate the pic-
ture.37 Finally, multilateral frameworks that envision processes of joint action –
even in the immediate-response-requiring sphere of counter-terrorism – have to
be constructed with regard to the ideational spirit and institutional logic of each
community. In consequence, the road to counter-terrorism as an experiment in
region building will be a long one.
THE REGIONAL CONTEXT
So far, multilateral cooperation against terrorism in Europe and Southeast
Asia has focused more on capacity building and the sharing of best practices,
than on structural re-adjustments and policy coordination. In the majority of
cases, the direct outcome of multilateral framework agreements has been to
strengthen cooperation at the bilateral and trilateral levels. For instance, days
before the signing of the ASEAN Work Programme on Counter-Terrorism, the
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Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia ratified a trilateral security pact for mutual
assistance in the fight against terrorism.38 The accord’s primary objective was to
intensify joint patrols and intelligence sharing among co-signatories, aimed at
curbing the movement of suspected terrorists and illegal substances across bor-
ders. The pact was later joined by Cambodia and Thailand, with Singapore also
expressing interest.39 Prior to that, Malaysia and Indonesia had created a Joint
Malaysian-Indonesian General Border Committee to oversee maritime and land-
border policing.40 In November 2001, Singapore and Indonesia met to discuss
piracy and bilateral defence cooperation.41 Most recently, in July 2004,
Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia have launched trilateral coordinated patrols
in the vital shipping lane of the Straits of Malacca to deter terrorism and to curb
maritime piracy.42
Similarly, in Europe bilateral and trilateral agency-to-agency information
sharing and the reciprocal granting of access to detainees have been the most
effective measures in terms of producing results-oriented outcomes to date. Joint
counter-terrorism investigations like OPERATION MAGNESIUM and OPERA-
TION DATIL (Date) – pooling together the efforts and resources of intelligence
and security agencies as far apart as France, Italy, Spain, Belgium, the
Netherlands, and the UK – have proved decisive for dismantling al-Qaeda’s
European networks and putting into place the various pieces of the bin Laden
puzzle.43 Following the Madrid bombings, Spain, Italy, France, and Belgium
have worked together to dismantle the clandestine network responsible for the
attack. Together with the United States, France, Britain, and Germany are already
engaged in joint intelligence gathering missions in East Africa and
Afghanistan.44
However, some crucial differences between the European and Southeast
Asian response still remain. For one, there is a clear divergence in terms of threat
perceptions and vulnerability assessments. Second, the varying historical experi-
ences of each region predispose each framework community to address these
issues differently. Third, a comprehensive counter-terrorism response at the
regional level – aimed at countering the transnational threat of global terrorism
– requires a pooling together of resources, a degree of bureaucratic centraliza-
tion, and a level of political like-mindedness. The extent to which such econom-
ic and political integration has been achieved plays a significant role for crafting
multilateral policy outcomes in each region. 
Europe’s Response
One of the main differences between the European and Southeast Asian
response to global terrorism comes from the different ways in which the terror-
ist threat is perceived. A marked distinction exists between the “West” and the
“East” in this regard. Europe’s past experiences with terrorism have been con-
fined to what is commonly referred to as “conventional terrorism.” Even at the
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height of their destructive potential, leftist, rightist, and ethno-nationalist groups
– such as the Red Army Faction (RAF) in Germany, the Red Brigades in Italy,
the Basque Fatherland and Liberty Party (ETA) in Spain, and the Irish
Republican Army (IRA) in Great Britain – have all used violence with restraint.
These organizations were interested not only in “propaganda by the deed” activ-
ities, but also in securing a place at the negotiating table. As such, they did not
engage in indiscriminate violence and could be “politically tamed” to an extent.45
In the mid-1990s, Europe’s brush with militant Islamist networks some-
what changed this perspective. The securitization of the “new terrorism” threat
required an acknowledgement of its transnational dimensions and potential for
mass-casualty attacks. To the degree that such securitization occurred, the phe-
nomenon of “religiously motivated” violence was regarded as a foreign threat.
Its origins lay in the close proximity of the “old continent” to North Africa and
the Middle East, and their respective zones of conflict (Algeria, Egypt, Sudan,
Tunisia, and the Israeli-Palestinian dispute). The hijacking of an Air France air-
craft in December 199446 and the GIA-orchestrated bombings of the Paris metro
system in the summer of 199547 were all explained in this fashion. They were
viewed not as acts of domestically inspired terrorism, but as acts of violent retal-
iation against France.48
Despite available information on al-Qaeda as far back as 1996, Europe
was not ready to face the challenge posed by bin Laden.49 The organization’s
multi-ethnic membership, multi-dimensional strategy, and multi-layered activi-
ties were considered “outside” the scope of continent-wide anti-terrorism legis-
lation. Even when joint investigations succeeded in dismantling a number of
North African and Egyptian militant networks associated with al-Qaeda prior to
9/11, the individuals arrested were portrayed as political refugees who had effec-
tively transported violence directed against their home regimes to European
soil.50 In coming to the West these terrorists had taken advantage of the conti-
nent’s open borders, networked societies, and tolerant policies. As such, Europe’s
way of life and European citizens were not viewed as their immediate targets.
In the aftermath of 11 September and in the light of new revelations about
al-Qaeda, Europe was once again compelled to re-conceptualize the bin Laden
problem. The fact that four of the 11 September hijackers had resided in
Germany and traveled throughout the continent – maintaining terrorism connec-
tions in countries like Spain, the UK, and Italy – was seen as an indication that
Europe had been used as a launching platform for the WTC and Pentagon
attacks. A number of disrupted terrorist plots against US targets in Europe rein-
forced the perception that al-Qaeda had gained a local presence and reach.51
European governments and societies braced themselves to respond to this “com-
mon external threat.” 
The EU policy response in the aftermath of 11 September closely mirrored
this threat projection. The gist of European counter-terrorism legislation focused
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on four main areas: the suppression of terrorist finances; the adoption of common
definitions on terrorism; the strengthening of immigration and asylum proce-
dures; and the enhancing of cooperation efforts between European police and
judiciary.52 A number of vulnerabilities that had helped bin Laden and his asso-
ciates gain a foothold in Europe were also addressed. Joint patrols along EU’s
porous borders were discussed; EU requirements for granting Schengen visas
were updated; and regional legislation proscribing “hate speech” was consid-
ered.53 Additionally, a joint EU terrorism task force was established, with the
goal of maintaining open channels of communication and accelerating the
processes of information sharing between Europe and the United States.54
Previous EU experiences in fighting terrorism were also tapped into.
Countries like France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK had already developed
sound counter-terrorism protection measures. Although crafted to meet the threat
of domestic terrorism, the presence of such infrastructure considerably expedit-
ed the implementation of unilateral and multilateral initiatives to respond to al-
Qaeda’s global challenge. At the unilateral level aviation security measures were
strengthened; national emergency committees were established; critical national
infrastructure was target-hardened; and intra-departmental intelligence gathering
and intelligence analysis were instituted. At the multilateral level a framework
decision to implement a common European arrest warrant was adopted; negoti-
ations for the creation of a common European judicial space were held; and
police force cooperation in Europe was streamlined under the aegis of Europol.55
Other successes include the maintenance of a unified list of terrorist members
and terrorist organizations, and the EU-wide ratification of UN Security Council
Resolutions 1373 and 1390. 
The Madrid attacks lent a new urgency to multilateral efforts to combat
global terrorism. The painful recognition that all EU governments face a similar
threat convinced them of the need to continue crafting a common European
response. Until then, the emphasis had always been on coordinating national
anti-terrorism policies rather than on pursuing a coherent and uniform multilat-
eral approach.56 This had presented European policy makers with considerable
difficulties. For one, the EU lacked the resources and the mandate to enforce EU
counter-terrorism agreements. Once ratified, these agreements were rarely con-
sistently implemented.57 Second, national anti-terrorism responses among the 25
EU member-states varied considerably. Governments found it difficult to coor-
dinate their own ministries and agencies involved in counter-terrorism. At the
inter-governmental level such obstacles were further compounded by bureau-
cratic inefficiency, overlapping mandates, and the unwillingness of EU security
and intelligence agencies to share sensitive information.58
The appointment of Dutch politician Gijs de Vries as the “EU counter-ter-
rorism tsar” was designed specifically to deal with these issues. His primary task
is to promote a greater institutional role for the EU by streamlining national anti-
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terrorism policies and encouraging EU security agencies to cooperate with one
another.59 De Vries is also in charge of overseeing the activities of the various EU
bodies engaged in counter-terrorism. A plethora of other multilateral initiatives
have also been adopted. At the first EU anti-terror summit held in Brussels in the
late March 2004, EU leaders called for structural reforms and even set deadlines
for their implementation. These reforms focused on improving port and public
transport security, enhancing the suppression of terrorist financing, regularizing
procedures for storing telephone and internet data, speeding up the introduction
of EU biometric visas and passports, and creating a common database for non-
EU visa holders.60 In November 2004, European interior and justice ministers
ratified a five-year plan known as the “Hague programme.” The plan envisions
enhancing security and justice coordination among EU member-states, and
grants national police officers access to information held by law enforcement
agencies in other EU countries.61
All counter-terrorism measures described above were implemented on the
premise that the European Union is the most highly developed structure for
regional integration in the world. Even if previous attempts at institutionalization
emphasized economic development and trade, the events of 11 September and
especially the Madrid attacks highlighted the need for greater policy harmoniza-
tion and resource centralization. To the extent that multilateral counter-terrorism
initiatives offered “a common platform for cooperation,” they succeeded in
strengthening the resolve of member-states to contribute efforts and capabilities
to the joint fight against al-Qaeda.62 As the UK Minister for Europe Peter Hain
proclaimed on the notion of shared sovereignty:
I do not see sovereignty merely as the ability of a single country to
say no. I see it as something to be deployed to our national advan-
tage. In today’s globalized world, where individual governments
count for less and less, our strength as an independent nation derives
from the strength of the alliances and partnerships we make with oth-
ers. By sharing some sovereignty within the EU, we gain more, not
less, independence of action; more, not less, self-government; and
more, not less, control over our lives within the EU. 63
However, regional cooperation in Europe continues to be highly dependent
on existing “working relationships” and the dominant political environment.64
The majority of EU-crafted initiatives are still at their inception phase.
Discussions to create a unified homeland defence framework have so far floun-
dered. Centrally directed measures are not always equally followed in their coun-
try-to-country implementation. For example, the introduction of a common
European arrest warrant has been delayed because countries like Germany, Italy,
Austria, and the Netherlands are still struggling with reconciling its enforceable
provisions with their own constitutions. Similarly, member-states, such as
Belgium and Greece – that consider themselves outside of the “critical threat
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level” environment, have dismantled previously adopted emergency prepared-
ness plans.65 To this day, the leading countries in bilateral and trilateral coopera-
tion continue to be France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK. As a result, the
ambiguous dynamic between sovereign rule and regional initiatives still persists
in Europe. 
Asia’s Response
In Southeast Asia the threat of global terrorism is exemplified by the pres-
ence of one of al-Qaeda’s regional branches.  The clandestine terrorist network
Jemaah Islamiyah spans the territories of Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia,
Thailand, and the Philippines. Its terrorist constituency comprises predominant-
ly Southeast Asian nationals. JI-orchestrated bombings and martyrdom opera-
tions have taken place throughout the region, targeting both Western interests and
local citizens.66 Operational links between al-Qaeda and regional militant
groups, such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Abu Sayyaf
Group (ASG) in the Philippines, and the Kumpulan Militan Malaysia (MMI) in
Malaysia, have all reiterated the localized character of the threat.67 As such, al-
Qaeda is considered to have gained an “indigenous face” in Southeast Asia.
In terms of securitizing the phenomenon, the focus has been not only on
Jemaah Islamiyah and its deadly activities, but also on the rise of radical Islam
in the region. The fluid and complicated nature of this challenge is emphasized
by the fact that Southeast Asia hosts some of the world’s most populous Muslim
nations. Indonesia and Malaysia are home to over 200 million Muslims.68 The
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand have significant Muslim minorities as well.
Although moderate views dominate mainstream Islam in the region, a steady
shift has occurred – in the past two decades or so – toward more radical per-
spectives and militant interpretations of the religion.69
At one end of this spectrum stand the extremist views of Jemaah
Islamiyah. Although the organization had its origins in the Darul Islam rebellions
of the 1950s in Indonesia – and originally aimed to overthrow the government of
President Suharto and to replace it with an Islamic state – in recent years the
group has redirected its efforts toward the establishment of a pan-Islamic
caliphate in Southeast Asia.70 Similar to al-Qaeda’s global worldview, JI’s ide-
ology seeks to revive the form of pristine Islam and the type of divinely ordained
government practiced by Islam’s founding fathers (salaf).71 Its strategy is to
replicate the historic conquest of pagan Arabia in Southeast Asia by staging
indiscriminate acts of terror against ruling elites and local societies. To this pur-
pose, the group has co-opted the campaigns of regional insurgencies by sharing
resources, operatives, and expertise.72 Influenced by JI, Islamist militants have
progressed from the strictly local outlook and political objectives of “banning
vice” and enforcing the Sharia (Islamic legal code) to a transnational agenda of
global jihad (holy war). As a result, communal conflicts have escalated and
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provincial groups have engaged in terrorism, two previously rarely observed
phenomena. 
At the other end of the spectrum stand the Islamic opposition parties and
the Islamist social movements of Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and the
Philippines. These organizations have been particularly vocal in their criticisms
of the social and economic policies of their secular governments. In negotiating
a role for the Muslims in the multi-ethnic environments of Southeast Asia, their
members have occasionally adopted more radical political stances. The majority
of these organizations opposes America’s presence in the region and politicizes
internally the problems of Muslim communities worldwide. In consequence,
they have become the driving force behind a trans-regional initiative to
Islamicize domestic politics in Southeast Asia. 
However, regional elections across Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,
and Thailand in the period 2004-05 have dampened such expectations. Islamist
parties have either garnered low voter turnouts or were defeated. In Malaysia, the
Islamist opposition party PAS lost one of its stronghold states and was trounced
at the hands of the ruling party coalition, UMNO.73 In Indonesia, the Golkar
party emerged as the election front-runner, but did not collect enough votes to
hold a steady parliament majority. It currently shares power with Megawati’s
PDI-P and a plethora of other small parties. Avowedly Islamist political organi-
zations like the PPP (United Development Party), the PBB (Moon and Star
Party), and the PKS (Justice Party) gained only marginal increases, indicating a
certain lack of popular support for their pro-Shariah platforms.74
Much more worrying, however, are developments in the Philippines and
Southern Thailand. The Arroyo government, which managed to maintain its
leadership position during the May 2004 elections, has been confronted with
repeated rumors of a coup d’état.75 Meanwhile, the Philippine army has been bat-
tling two armed insurgencies, the communist National People’s Army (NPA) and
the Islamist Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). The unsteady pace of peace negotiations
with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), together with intelligence
reports that JI terrorists are still hiding in MILF-controlled territory, have pro-
vided little additional respite.76
The Islamist insurgency in southern Thailand, on the other hand, has
become another source of security concerns. Although the insurgency still
exhibits the characteristics of a locally organized and locally inspired conflict,
the spiral of violence has engulfed the three southernmost Thai provinces. The
initially heavy-handed response of Prime Minister Thaksin’s government –
together with diplomatic rows that erupted between Thailand and Malaysia over
alleged logistical support to Thai separatists – have created additional fractures
in the precarious political landscape of the region.77 Nonetheless, the topic has
been steadily avoided during ASEAN meetings and has become the subject pri-
marily of closed-door discussions among regional policy makers.
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What this indicates is that the security context of ASEAN member-states
has always revolved around their domestic political developments. In contrast to
the image of authoritarian governments treading on the rights of their citizens,
the reality in Southeast Asia is that the “state” is open to contestation, particu-
larly from religious, ethnic, and linguistic groups promoting separatist or
transnational agendas.78 The danger of al-Qaeda’s style of terrorism to the region
comes not so much from the violent activities of Jemaah Islamiyah per se, but
from the social and political repercussions of a religio-political phenomenon that
no longer identifies with a particular territory or jurisdictional authority. In con-
sequence, acts of domestic and international terrorism have struck at the core of
the “social contract” between rulers and ruled. They have endangered not only
the peaceful and harmonious co-existence of various communities, but also each
country’s founding principles and day-to-day rationale. In the process, Southeast
Asian governments and institutions have become de-legitimized to an extent.
Underlying socio-economic grievances have risen to the surface and Islamist
opposition parties have been quick to capitalize on such pessimistic outlooks. As
a result, the fragility of post-colonial nation-states in Southeast Asia has played
to the strategic advantage of bin Laden and his regional followers. 
In the aftermath of 11 September, ASEAN’s response to this “common
internal threat” was to construct anti-terrorism partnerships focusing on bolster-
ing individual country-to-country defence mechanisms. On 17 May 2002, an
ASEAN Work Programme on Counter-Terrorism was adopted.79 Various ARF
workshops on terrorism were held.80 Meetings of ASEAN police chiefs dis-
cussed practical measures and explored avenues for regional cooperation to com-
bat 12 forms of transnational crime that included “drug trafficking, terrorism,
arms smuggling, people trafficking, maritime crime, commercial crime, banking
crime, credit card fraud, cyber crime, travel document fraud and transnational
fraud.”81 All relevant international anti-terrorist conventions were studied, with
the view of integrating them within the ASEAN mechanisms for combating ter-
rorism.82 Special emphasis was placed on developing regional capacity-building
programs to enhance existing anti-terrorism capabilities. The establishment of
national focal points for information exchange and the sharing of technical
expertise were also negotiated.83 Framework agreements for deepening regional
cooperation among front-line ASEAN law enforcement agencies were ratified.84
In the aftermath of the two Jakarta bombings, ASEAN member-states even
thought it expedient to launch an initiative to develop a region-wide legal frame-
work for combating terrorism.85 All of these measures contributed, in part, to the
dismantling of JI’s infrastructure in Southeast Asia and to the heightening of ter-
rorism awareness in the region.
However, the majority of these initiatives represent only initial forays in
the direction of a comprehensive multilateral security framework to counter al-
Qaeda’s global challenge. The securitization of the phenomenon of internation-
al terrorism and its overlap with the rise of radical Islam in the region have cre-
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ated a situation in which local governments are particularly careful about inter-
national commitments that might interfere with their economic development and
policy priorities. As newly independent states, which embarked simultaneously
on economic development and nation-building, they are protective of their
boundaries and sovereignty. Resource issues and bureaucratic competition gen-
erally prevent ASEAN member-states from coordinating their activities in a sus-
tained and synchronized fashion, except where immediate short-term political
and economic interests are concerned. As a result, ASEAN’s multilateral frame-
work of counter-terrorism mechanisms has been more notable for capacity-build-
ing and confidence-enhancing measures than for member-states taking concrete
actions or acting in concert. 
In part, this is due to the institutional and functional modalities of ASEAN.
Founded as “a forum for preventing, managing, and resolving conflicts among
its members” in a peaceful way, the community is premised on the two-fold prin-
ciples of “consensus-building” and “non-intervention.”86 Member-states’ auton-
omy has always been preferred vis-à-vis outside influence and interference. This
is evident not only in terms of the involvement of great powers in the region, but
also in terms of member-to-member collaboration. Furthermore, with the end of
the Cold War, ASEAN is a much-weakened institution whose objectives and
framework are in dire need of restructuring. As a result, local countries have cho-
sen to respond individually to the JI network.
Similar to Europe, outcome-oriented counter-terrorism collaboration has
taken place at the bilateral and trilateral levels. Countries like Singapore have
shared information with and provided assistance to regional counterparts, most
notably Malaysia, Thailand, and Brunei. Case-by-case debriefings of detained JI
activists have been arranged on the basis of separate investigations. Individual
ASEAN countries have taken upon themselves the initiative to develop regional
hubs of anti-terrorism expertise and training. At present, Malaysia is in the
process of establishing a regional counter-terrorism center in Kuala Lumpur.87
Indonesia is developing an international intelligence center aimed at providing
graduate level training for regional police officers. Singapore relies on a Joint
Counter Terrorism Center (JCTC) to coordinate inter-agency intelligence
exchange and intelligence analysis throughout the region. As such, in meeting
the challenges posed by JI locally and al-Qaeda regionally, Southeast Asian
nations have reacted as countries respective of each other’s autonomy, but cog-
nizant of the need to act swiftly and decisively against this common threat. 
CONCLUSION
This article has argued that the responses of Europe and Southeast Asia to
11 September, the Bali bombings, the two Jakarta bombings, and the Madrid
train bombings have been predicated on two main factors, namely the perception
of the terrorist threat and the level of institutionalization of each regional com-
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munity. While Europe associated the security challenge posed by al-Qaeda and
its supporters with an external foreign threat – originating, in the majority of
cases, outside of its perimeters and equated primarily with non-citizens or first
and second generation immigrants who had effectively transported violence
directed against their home countries to European soil – the security challenge
posed by bin Laden’s operatives in Southeast Asia was of a radically distinct
nature. Since the vast majority of JI members were of local origin and had effec-
tively used the region’s internal security problems as the operating framework
from within which to launch their terrorist campaign, al-Qaeda was considered
to have gained an “indigenous face.”  The challenge of terrorism in Southeast
Asia was therefore viewed as an internal domestic problem, testing both the
political survival of local regimes and the post-colonial boundaries through
which the body politic was framed. 
Whereas the European anti-terrorism policy response reflected the reality
of the EU being the most highly developed structure for regional integration in
the world, the ASEAN reaction emphasized the soft-mechanism frameworks
prevalent in Southeast Asia. The varying projections of the terrorist threat served
to reinforce the ideational and operational modalities of each community. While
EU nation-states felt comfortable with notions of shared sovereignty and the
external nature of the threat,88 ASEAN member-states – as newly independent
countries protective of their sovereignty and identity as multicultural societies –
were initially defensive of their boundaries and al-Qaeda’s internal challenge to
their domestic political contexts. The resulting policy outcomes highlighted the
ideational spirit and institutional logic of each community. The EU response
focused on greater legislative harmonization and policy coordination. The
ASEAN response implemented informal tracks of cooperation, most notably in
the spheres of sharing expertise and “best practices.” As such, individual nation-
states – in dealing with the problem of global terrorism – partook and benefited
from the multilateral frameworks for cooperation and coordination that they
themselves had instituted in each region. 
However, in view of the fluid and evolving nature of the threat – as evi-
denced by the continuing string of terrorist attacks worldwide – concerted efforts
to enhance regional anti-terrorism protection and prevention must continue.  The
path forward is to move in the direction of greater institutionalization. More
areas of joint action can be outlined and followed through, as well as greater
adherence to UN-mandated and regionally crafted policy initiatives can be
implemented. EU’s current search for a shared security and defence identity can
prove beneficial for counter-terrorism cooperation, especially in the spheres of
judicial and security collaboration. Likewise, the recently proposed initiative at
the 9th ASEAN Summit in Bali, Indonesia to institute an ASEAN Security
Community as a founding pillar of ASEAN practices and objectives can help
mitigate the lack of coordinated political will in the region and free the necessary
resources to advance toward a more comprehensive and action-oriented counter-
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terrorism response.89 Such response is particularly needed in the “soft-security”
areas of trans-border flows of individuals, weapons, and money in the region.  In
all cases the prevalent wisdom is that if the EU and ASEAN fail to respond effec-
tively and efficiently to the modern-day challenges of a type of terrorism that
kills their citizens and targets their interests on the principle “anyone, anywhere,
anytime,” their relevance as adequate multilateral frameworks for regional peace
and cooperation will be seriously undermined.
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